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207 
MISSOURI’S HEALTH CARE BATTLE AND 
DIFFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
POPULAR LAWMAKING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The appeal of popular lawmaking, one of the few ways in which 
citizens of our country may make their wishes directly known without 
elected officials acting as intermediaries, is obvious.
1
 Whether via citizen-
initiated petition or propositions from the legislature, more than half the 
states currently provide their citizens with the opportunity to enact laws 
through the ballot box.
2
 Popular participation in government is a principle 
that has been endorsed with lofty rhetoric by some of history‘s most gifted 
political theorists. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, ―The absolute sovereignty 
of the will of the majority is the essence of democratic government . . . .‖3 
Abraham Lincoln asserted, ―A majority . . . is the only true sovereign of a 
free people. Whoever rejects it does of necessity fly to anarchy or to 
despotism.‖4 
In 2010, Missouri voters opted to exercise their lawmaking prerogative 
by passing Proposition C (―Prop C‖), a popularly enacted response to the 
now-infamous federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
5
 As it 
appeared on the ballot, Prop C asked: ―Shall the Missouri Statutes be 
amended to: Deny the government authority to penalize citizens for 
refusing to purchase private health insurance or infringe upon the right to 
 
 
 1. I would like to thank Professor David Law for suggesting this topic. 
 2. HAREL ARNON, A THEORY OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 5 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2008) (citing 
THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 276 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001)). The popular lawmaking 
process initially gained traction in a few states, beginning with South Dakota, toward the end of the 
nineteenth century; by 1918, eighteen or so states were using some form of popular lawmaking. AM. 
BAR ASS‘N STANDING COMM. ON ELECTION LAW, INITIATIVES: PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS 4 (1991). 
While some of these states do not make significant use of popular lawmaking as a form of legislation, 
several states—including California, Oregon, and Colorado—make extensive use of popular 
lawmaking, particularly via voter initiative (as opposed to popularly made laws that find their way to 
the ballot via acts of state legislatures). Id. at 4–5. For further description of different kinds of popular 
lawmaking, see discussion infra note 76. For a more detailed history of the adoption and spread of 
popular lawmaking among the states, see ARNON, supra, at 9–15. 
 3. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 246 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence 
trans., Harper Collins 1988) (1850), quoted in Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct 
Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 447 (1998). 
 4. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 5, 9 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897), 
quoted in Clark, supra note 3, at 447. 
 5. For a more in-depth discussion of the circumstances surrounding the bill‘s passage and 
subsequent voter approval, see discussion infra Part II. 
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offer or accept direct payment for lawful healthcare services?‖6 Missouri 
voters overwhelmingly answered ―yes‖; Prop C passed with more than 70 
percent of the vote.
7
 Prop C‘s chief sponsor in the Missouri Senate 
asserted, ―The citizens of the Show-Me State don‘t want Washington 
involved in their health care decisions.‖8 One Prop C supporter boasted 
that it was ―the vote heard ‘round the world.‖9 However, the bill‘s critics 
denounced it as ―a waste of time.‖10 
It seems clear that a state law whose unequivocal purpose is to ―deny‖ 
authority to the federal government will not be allowed to stand if and 
when it becomes subject to judicial review under the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution.
11
 However, whether or not the outcome of 
judicial review of Prop C is a foregone conclusion, the questions of 
exactly why the law is invalid, and what process of inquiry a court should 
go through to invalidate it, remain. The pertinent analytic framework for 
 
 
 6. H.B. 1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010) (emphasis added). I refer to both 
the bill and its subsequent ballot form as ―Prop C‖ throughout this Note. The other question presented 
to the voters asked: ―Shall the Missouri Statutes be amended to . . . Modify laws regarding the 
liquidation of certain domestic insurance companies?‖ Id. This second proposal does not relate to the 
issues discussed in this Note. 
 7. Tony Messenger, Prop C Sails Through, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 4, 2010, at A1. 
 8. Id. (quoting State Senator Jane Cunningham). 
 9. Id. (quoting Missouri voter Dwight Janson). 
 10. Editorial, Freedom, Fantasy, and Proposition C, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 23, 2010, 
at A12. Critics of Prop C denounced the bill as a waste of time for two primary reasons: (1) the 
relevant provisions of the federal health care bill would not go into effect until 2014, and (2) many 
believed that Prop C would be ―trumped‖ by the federal law. See infra notes 44–45. For more on the 
question of federal law ―trumping‖ Prop C, see discussion infra Part III. Some critics also took a more 
cynical view of Prop C, characterizing it as manipulation of voters by Republican politicians to gain 
political favor and visibility. An editorial in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch claimed:  
They say Proposition C is about protecting individual freedom and states‘ rights. They tout 
the vote‘s symbolic value, which they see as the first shot in a battle to repeal the national 
reforms. . . . [But] Proposition C is nothing but a taxpayer-funded political exercise designed 
to raise cash for Republican candidates, consultants and causes. 
Editorial, supra, at A12. 
 11.  
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Media sources in Missouri observed this potential conflict between Prop C 
and the federal law: ―The biggest question about Tuesday‘s results, of course, is what they mean to the 
national debate. Not much tangibly, we‘d guess, because the Constitution‘s supremacy clause says 
federal law trumps state laws.‖ Editorial, “Big Megaphone” Muffled, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 
5, 2010, at A14. Legal scholars also expressed skepticism about the state law‘s constitutional validity. 
See Messenger, supra note 7, at A1 (―Richard Reuben, a law professor at the University of Missouri 
School of Law, said that if the federal government sues on the issue, it would likely win. Several other 
Missouri legal and political scholars agreed.‖). Prop C‘s advocates, however, did not appear to be 
concerned with this potential conflict. See infra note 41. 
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judicial review of Prop C is most likely the federal preemption analysis—
an analysis of whether or not the law presents sufficient conflict with 
federal law that it must be struck down as unconstitutional under the 
Supremacy Clause.
12
 Potentially, the standard federal preemption analysis 
could be modified to account for the popular origins of Prop C by either 
relaxing or increasing the level of judicial scrutiny applied.
13
 Does the 
mere fact of the law‘s conflict with federal law automatically render it 
impermissible? Do the popular origins of the law make it particularly 
suspect when weighed against the product of constitutionally dictated, 
representative government?
14
 Or, should those origins bestow additional 
merit on the law?
15
 
This Note will open with a brief history of the process leading up to 
Prop C‘s enactment,16 and will then discuss the basic framework for 
federal preemption analysis and the history of judicial review of popularly 
enacted laws.
17
 This Note will then present two opposing views regarding 
the appropriate standard for judicial review of popular legislation: (1) As 
legislation created outside constitutionally prescribed government 
structure, popular legislation is constitutionally suspect and should thus be 
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny,
18
 and (2) As an expression of pure 
majority will, popular legislation occupies a unique position in our 
democratic society and should thus be accorded special judicial 
deference.
19
 Finally, this Note will argue that neither of these approaches 
is appropriate, and that the proper way to balance the ideological weight of 
popular lawmaking with its non-constitutional status is to view popular 
legislation through the same lens as its traditionally enacted counterpart.
20
 
 
 
 12. See supra note 11. The Commerce Clause is another relevant constitutional framework here, 
since it presents one possible basis for an evaluation of the federal health care law itself. See 
discussion infra note 35. 
 13. Numerous scholars have proposed differential levels of judicial analysis when courts evaluate 
popularly enacted laws. See, e.g., K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption 
Equation: A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221 (2005), which will be 
discussed in significantly greater detail infra Part V; Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct 
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990), which will be discussed in significantly greater detail infra 
Part IV; see also ARNON, supra note 2; Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the 
Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: 
Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 373. 
 14. See Eule, supra note 13; see also discussion infra Part IV. 
 15. See DuVivier, supra note 13; see also discussion infra Part V. 
 16. See discussion infra Part II. 
 17. See discussion infra Part III. 
 18. See discussion infra Part IV; see also Eule, supra note 13. 
 19. See discussion infra Part V; see also DuVivier, supra note 13. 
 20. See discussion infra Part VI. 
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Throughout this discussion, this Note will highlight specific features of 
Prop C that illustrate the pros and cons of each standard of judicial review. 
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF PROPOSITION C 
Missouri House Bill 1764, which would later become Prop C, was 
introduced in the State House of Representatives on January 21, 2010.
21
 In 
its original form, the bill was a relatively innocuous revision of section 
375.1175 of the Missouri Statutes—a provision containing liquidation 
guidelines for certain insurance companies.
22
 However, the bill would 
soon become the nexus of a statewide struggle against ―the 
unconstitutional encroachments of the federal government.‖23  
While House Bill 1764 was working its way through the legislative 
process, a resolution was introduced in the House that would have 
submitted to the voters of Missouri a proposal to amend the state 
constitution to address health care laws.
24
 The pertinent part of the 
proposed amendment would read: ―To preserve the freedom of citizens of 
[Missouri] to provide for their health care, no law or rule shall compel, 
directly or indirectly or through penalties or fines, any person, employer, 
or health care provider to participate in any health care system.‖25 This 
resolution never made it past the initial stages.
26
 However, on May 4, 
2010, State Senator Jane Cunningham proposed a bill that substituted the 
original, innocuous text of House Bill 1764 with her own radically revised 
language.
27
 Senator Cunningham‘s substitute language maintained the 
repeal of section 375.1175, but would also ―enact in lieu thereof two new 
 
 
 21. H.R. JOURNAL, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 128 (Mo. 2010). 
 22. H.B. 1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1175 
(2010).  
 23. Video: January 13, 2010 - Senator Jane Cunningham Speaks at Patriotic Rally at State 
Capitol (Mo. Senate 2010), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/media/10info/Cunningham/ 
Cunningham-RallySpeech-011310.wmv. 
 24. H.R.J. Res. 48, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See S. JOURNAL, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 603 (Mo. 2010) (last Senate journal entry 
in which H.R.J. Res. 48 appears). 
 27. S. JOURNAL, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 1254 (Mo. 2010). Senator Cunningham, an 
elected legislator since 2000, had primarily sponsored bills pertaining to education and labor 
regulation prior to stepping into the spotlight for Missouri‘s health care battle. SENATOR JANE 
CUNNINGHAM, http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/members/mem07.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2011). 
More recently, she sponsored Senate Resolution 27 that urged the Attorney General of Missouri to file 
a lawsuit challenging the validity of the federal health care law to which Prop C was addressed. S. Res. 
27, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011). The Senate adopted her resolution. S. JOURNAL, 
96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. 106 (Mo. 2011). 
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sections relating to insurance, with a referendum clause.‖28 While the 
revised bill did not aim to amend the state constitution, it clearly adopted 
the language of Resolution 48.
29
 This revised bill would become known as 
the Health Care Freedom Act. Senator Cunningham‘s revision of House 
Bill 1764, despite its significant departure from the original bill‘s purpose, 
passed overwhelmingly in the Senate by a vote of 26–8 and was 
subsequently adopted by the House.
30
 Just a few weeks later, the bill was 
delivered to the Secretary of State for inclusion on the August 3 state 
ballot as Proposition C.
31
 
Prop C and its predecessor, Resolution 48, were both responses to the 
then-pending Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a massive health 
care reform effort by the federal government that was signed into law on 
March 23, 2010.
32
 Given Prop C‘s language regarding compulsory 
participation and penalties, it seems clear that the referendum was 
primarily concerned with section 1501 of the health care bill, which 
amended the I.R.S. Code to impose a tax penalty on individuals failing to 
meet certain minimum coverage requirements.
33
  
 
 
 28. H.B. 1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 29. ―No law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health care 
provider to participate in any health care system.‖ Id. Moreover, the attached referendum clause posed 
the pertinent question directly to Missouri voters: ―Shall the Missouri Statutes be amended to [d]eny 
the government authority to penalize citizens for refusing to purchase private health insurance or 
infringe upon the right to offer or accept direct payment for lawful healthcare services?‖ Id. 
 30. S. JOURNAL, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 1254 (Mo. 2010); H.R. JOURNAL, 95th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 1455–58 (Mo. 2010). 
 31. H.R. JOURNAL, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. 1973 (Mo. 2010). 
 32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 33. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501 (to be codified at I.R.S. Code 
§ 5000A(b)). The bill requires that: 
 (a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.—An 
applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, 
and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under 
minimum essential coverage for such month. 
 (b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT.— 
 (1) IN GENERAL.—If an applicable individual fails to meet the requirement of 
subsection (a) for 1 or more months during any calendar year beginning after 2013, then, 
except as provided in subsection (d), there is hereby imposed a penalty with respect to the 
individual in the amount determined under subsection (c). 
Id. State Representative Tim Jones, one of Prop C‘s major proponents, described the Health Care 
Freedom Act as follows:  
The Act contains two major provisions: protections for Missourians from being forced to 
purchase health insurance and a prohibition against government fines and penalties for 
refusing to purchase insurance. This legislation was crafted because Missourians are far more 
capable of making their own health care decisions than Washington politicians and 
bureaucrats. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, despite voters‘ concerns about potential penalties for failure 
to purchase health insurance, the rhetoric surrounding Prop C in the 
months leading up to the election made clear that there were more 
significant concerns at stake.
34
 From the beginning, the bill‘s supporters 
called into question the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act.
35
 Voters echoed these sentiments: as one Prop C 
 
 
Timothy W. Jones, The Case for Health Care Freedom, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (July 13, 2010, 
9:03 AM), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/07/the-case-for-health-care-freedom. 
 34. See discussion infra Part II. 
 35. While this Note focuses on a constitutional analysis of Prop C itself with respect to federal 
law under the Supremacy Clause, supporters of Prop C invoked a number of other constitutional 
issues. Senator Cunningham called the federal bill ―an attack on our freedom and an effort to control 
our very lives.‖ Video: January 13, 2010 - Senator Jane Cunningham Speaks at Patriotic Rally at State 
Capitol, supra note 23. Senator Cunningham promised her supporters that the bill would ―protect[] 
your rights, your constitutional rights, to choose your medical and your insurance providers.‖ Id. 
(emphasis added). State Senator Jim Lembke characterized the federal legislation as a ―taking over of 
powers that were not delegated to the federal government.‖ Audio: Week of 01.11.10 - Senator Jim 
Lembke Discusses State Sovereignty (Mo. Senate 2010), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/ 
media/10info/Lembke/Lembke-Podcast-Sovereignty-011410.mp3. He argued, ―[Prop C will] allow us 
to start the debate about what is a proper role of federal government and what are the powers that are 
afforded the federal government in our Constitution, Article I, section 8, the enumerated powers.‖ Id. 
Representative Jones expounded at length upon the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act: 
The authority of the federal government to pass legislation that requires the purchase of a 
private product is highly questionable. While the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution has been used to justify federal regulation of private enterprise [see discussion 
infra], never before in our nation‘s history has ―inactivity‖ been regulated. That is, while the 
active participation in commerce and private enterprise has been regulated by the federal 
government for years, individuals have never been forced to participate ―in‖ commerce, as the 
federal health care law would require. This expanded power creates a dangerous precedent for 
government overreach, and has the potential to dramatically expand the size and scope of 
government. 
Jones, supra note 33. Included among the ―enumerated powers‖ of Article I, section 8, the Commerce 
Clause states: ―The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States.‖ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This clause has been expansively interpreted over 
time as granting the federal government authority to regulate an extremely wide range of activities, 
from discrimination at roadside motels, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964), to private production of medical marijuana, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Generally, 
the Commerce Clause allows the federal government to regulate activities having a substantial relation 
to or substantial effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
Congress did, in fact, assert within the text of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that the 
Act itself was an appropriate exercise of its Commerce Clause powers: ―The individual responsibility 
requirement provided for in this section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially 
affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects described in paragraph 2.‖ Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act § 1501(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18091). The effects listed in the Act 
include economic decisions made by consumers regarding health care, the significant role played by 
the health care industry within the national economy, the creation of a new consumer class, the 
regulation of employee relations, and the impact of medical expenses on bankruptcy proceedings. Id. 
The Act also cites Supreme Court precedent holding that ―insurance is interstate commerce subject to 
Federal regulation.‖ Id. (citing United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass‘n, 322 U.S. 533 
(1944)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2011] MISSOURI‘S HEALTH CARE BATTLE 213 
 
 
 
 
supporter at a local rally bluntly put it, the federal government‘s health 
care regulation attempts were ―constitutionally wrong.‖36  
In addition to questioning the basis for federal authority behind the 
health care bill, Prop C‘s supporters also couched their arguments in terms 
of broader constitutional concepts concerning federalism, state 
sovereignty, and the very structure of American government.
37
 At a ―state 
sovereignty rally‖ around the introduction of Resolution 48, Senator 
Cunningham asserted, ―This is not about health care. It‘s about power.‖38 
One promotional video, created by advocacy group United for Missouri, 
declared that ―state sovereignty and state rights are on top of Missourians‘ 
priorities.‖39 Prop C‘s primary advocacy group, Missourians for Health 
Care Freedom (―MHCF‖), sought to sway voters by equating the passage 
of Prop C with ―freedom‖ from ―government control.‖40 MHCF also 
 
 
 36. United For Missouri, Missourians for Prop C: At the Top of Missourian’s Priorities, 
YOUTUBE (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XpOrJ6YfWkM. Another Missouri 
voter couched his constitutional objections in different terms:  
That the federal government can require an individual to buy health insurance, as mandated in 
the health care reform bill enacted by Congress in March, is a ludicrous and a gross violation 
of the First Amendment right of free speech, not to mention an intrusion into the private lives 
of U.S. citizens. 
Gene Carton, Letter to the Editor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 27, 2010, at A10. I do not address 
Mr. Carton‘s First Amendment concerns. 
 37. See discussion infra Part II. 
 38. Video: January 13, 2010 - Senator Jane Cunningham Speaks at Patriotic Rally at State 
Capitol, supra note 23. Senator Lembke, whom Senator Cunningham dubbed ―The Sovereignty King,‖ 
id., stated in a podcast: ―[I]f you go back and study our Founding Fathers, you‘ll see that the states 
were afforded traditionally more power than the federal government, and over time that has been 
flipped on its head.‖ Audio: Week of 01.11.10 - Senator Jim Lembke Discusses State Sovereignty, 
supra note 35. Senator Lembke also sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 34, which was 
introduced into the Missouri Senate several weeks before the introduction of Prop C. Resolution 34 
boldly stated:  
 NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the members of the Missouri Senate, 
Ninety-fifth General Assembly, Second Regular Session, the House of Representatives 
concurring therein, hereby affirm the sovereignty of the people of Missouri under the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States over all powers not otherwise delegated 
to the federal government by the Constitution of the United States; and 
 BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that this resolution shall serve as a notice and demand to 
the federal government to cease and desist any and all activities outside the scope of their 
constitutionally-delegated powers. 
S. Con. Res. 34, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010). 
 39. United For Missouri, supra note 36 (description of video). 
 40. ―Government control means you will have less freedom to make the health care choices that 
are best for you and your family.‖ FAQ, MISSOURIANS FOR HEALTH CARE FREEDOM (on file with 
author). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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couched its arguments in terms of broader ideology about the relationship 
between federal and state governments.
41
 
Above all, Prop C‘s proponents touted it as an opportunity to make a 
genuinely powerful statement regarding states‘ rights—a statement for 
which health care reform was merely a topical backdrop. ―The world is 
watching[!]‖ declared an MHCF promotional video.42 In the same video, 
Senator Cunningham called Prop C ―the most important vote in the entire 
nation.‖43  
Of course, the bill was not without its detractors. Criticism of the bill 
focused primarily on its meaninglessness, given its likely unenforceability 
as well as the fact that the most pertinent provision of the federal health 
care legislation—the individual mandate—would not go into effect until 
2014.
44
 Critics were also quick to remark that Prop C itself appeared 
 
 
 41. 
States have the rights to assert their 10th Amendment powers and affirm those rights in the 
state constitution. Two hundred and twenty years ago, some founders questioned the need for 
the First and Second Amendments, and the rest of the Bill of Rights, to be in the U.S. 
Constitution. Our rights have been preserved by the First and Second Amendments. The 
Health Care Freedom Act will protect the right to health care freedom in the same way.  
Id. The Tenth Amendment states: ―The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.‖ U.S. CONST. 
amend. X. Interestingly, Missourians for Health Care Freedom also addressed the issue of federal 
preemption. In response to the question, ―Why do the media diminish the strength of state sovereignty 
by stating that federal law usually trumps state law?,‖ the group answered:  
For well over 100 years, case law and legal battles have contained conflicts between federal 
laws and state laws. States have frequently questioned the legitimacy of federal statutes in 
many different areas . . . [T]his is nothing new. Depending on the issue and the way the 
federal statutes have been challenged, sometimes the Courts have ruled in favor of the federal 
law (Supremacy Clause, federal pre-emption, interstate commerce). But there are many 
examples of federal courts ruling in favor of the States. Being that the HCFA begs a question 
that has never before been presented to the Courts (whether or not the federal government can 
force a citizen of a state to purchase a product, health insurance), it is perfectly sensible to 
argue that Obamacare will be ruled upon as unconstitutional by the Courts. The HCFA will 
force that question. 
FAQ, MISSOURIANS FOR HEALTH CARE FREEDOM, supra. This idea of ―forcing the question‖ is 
compelling and will be addressed infra Part VI. For an example of ―the media diminish[ing] the 
strength of state sovereignty by stating that federal law usually trumps state law,‖ see note 11 supra. 
 42. Missourians for Health Care Freedom, COMING AUGUST 3rd: “YES” on Prop C for 
FREEDOM!, YOUTUBE (July 29, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HH6a-kEwVas. 
 43. Id. 
 44.  
They say Proposition C is about protecting individual freedom and states‘ rights. They tout 
the vote‘s symbolic value, which they see as the first shot in a battle to repeal the national 
reforms. But the truth is that regardless of what happens in Missouri on Aug. 3, the health 
care reform will remain in effect on Aug. 4. 
Editorial, supra note 10; see also Kevin Sack, Missouri Voters To Have Say On Health Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, at A14. 
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unconstitutional.
45
 The primarily ―symbolic‖ nature of Prop C—a nature 
underscored by much of its proponents‘ rhetoric—also prompted criticism 
that the bill was merely a cynical manipulation of conservative voter 
sentiment.
46
 The targeted use of radio ads (which appeared on conservative 
talk stations) and primarily Republican voter turnout in the August 3 
election provided some support for critics‘ characterization of the 
referendum as ―a Republican straw poll with a foregone conclusion.‖47  
Still, whether or not the results were truly reflective of the will of the 
general populace of Missouri, Prop C did pass by an overwhelming 
margin on August 3.
48
 The evidence demonstrates that this vote was about 
more than health care.
49
 More to the point, Prop C may properly be 
described as a plebiscite effort of constitutional proportions:
50
 an effort to 
force resolution of contentious constitutional issues.
51
 
 
 
 45. ―The proposition will have no legal standing . . . . From the beginning, we‘ve said it‘s 
meaningless and unconstitutional.‖ Brian B. Zuzenak, Executive Director of the Missouri Democratic 
Party, quoted in Sack, supra note 44, at A14. 
 46. ―Proposition C is nothing but a taxpayer-funded political exercise designed to raise cash for 
Republican candidates, consultants and causes.‖ Editorial, supra note 10, at A12. One Missouri voter 
dismissed Prop C as ―a meaningless effort meant to energize Tea Party voters [a loosely organized 
conservative grassroots political coalition] for the primary elections.‖ Bunnie Gronborg, Letter to the 
Editor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 25, 2010, at A16. 
 47. Sack, supra note 44; see also Editorial, supra note 11. 
 48. Messenger, supra note 7.  
 49. See supra text accompanying notes 35–41.  
 50. While there are other compelling constitutional grounds on which the federal health care law 
itself could be examined, see discussion supra note 35 and infra note 51, this Note focuses on 
preemption analysis as a way of more closely examining the procedural relationship between a 
controversial federal law and a popularly enacted state law challenging it. 
 51. Missouri was not alone in its decision to challenge the constitutional validity of the federal 
health care legislation. Other states took a variety of measures to attack the law. The Idaho state 
legislature passed the Idaho Health Freedom Act, which Governor Butch Otter signed into law on 
March 17, 2010. Nick Draper, Otter: No Contradiction Here in Idaho, IDAHO FALLS POST REGISTER, 
Mar. 18, 2010, at A1. The law prevented Idaho state officials from enforcing health care–related 
penalties and imposed an affirmative duty on the Attorney General to act in defense of the health care 
rights of Idahoans. H.B. 391, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010). The Idaho legislature offered this 
by way of rationale: 
STATEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY.  
 (1) The power to require or regulate a person‘s choice in the mode of securing health care 
services, or to impose a penalty related thereto, is not found in the Constitution of the United 
States of America, and is therefore a power reserved to the people pursuant to the Ninth 
Amendment, and to the several states pursuant to the Tenth Amendment. The state of Idaho 
hereby exercises its sovereign power to declare the public policy of the state of Idaho 
regarding the right of all persons residing in the state of Idaho in choosing the mode of 
securing health care services. 
 (2) It is hereby declared that the public policy of the state of Idaho, consistent with our 
constitutionally recognized and inalienable rights of liberty, is that every person within the 
state of Idaho is and shall be free to choose or decline to choose any mode of securing health 
care services without penalty or threat of penalty. 
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III. STANDARD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND 
POPULAR LAWMAKING 
A. Federal Preemption Analysis Under the Supremacy Clause 
Regardless of the ideological intent behind Prop C, the law creates a 
clear—even deliberate—conflict with the federal health care law, and is 
thus very likely subject to preemption by the federal law under the 
Supremacy Clause.
52
 The judiciary may strike down a state law under the 
Supremacy Clause for one of three reasons: (1) express preemption, (2) 
field preemption, or (3) conflict preemption.
53
  
 
 
Id. At least three other states sought to address the health care law via ballot measure. The Arizona 
Health Care Freedom Act, an amendment to the state constitution using language substantially similar 
to that of Prop C, see H.R. Con. Res. 2014, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), passed with 55 
percent of the vote on November 2, 2010, see Dianna M. Náñez, Pollster: Arizona Voters Mirror U.S. 
Trends, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 7, 2010, at B3. Oklahoma passed a similar constitutional amendment, 
see S.J. Res. 59, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010), by nearly 65 percent of the vote in the same election, 
see Election Results, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 3, 2010, at 9A (results for State Question No. 756). Colorado 
failed to pass a proposed amendment to block the national health care reform. Nancy Lofholm, The 
Colorado Vote: Amendment 63, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 2010, at B2. 
 Lawsuits were by far the most common challenges to the federal legislation, however. As of the 
writing of this Note, a massive lawsuit whose plaintiffs comprise attorney generals and/or governors of 
twenty-six states, two private citizens, and the National Federation of Independent Business is working 
its way through the federal courts. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Human Servs., 
No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). In this case, the district court 
judge granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the first count of their complaint, which 
challenged the constitutionality of the individual health insurance mandate under the Commerce 
Clause. In granting declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, the court wrote: 
Having found that ―activity‖ is an indispensable part [sic] the Commerce Clause analysis (at 
least as currently understood, defined, and applied in Supreme Court case law), the 
Constitutionality of the individual mandate will turn on whether the failure to buy health 
insurance is ―activity.‖. . . Preliminarily, based solely on a plain reading of the Act itself (and 
a common sense interpretation of the word ―activity‖ and its absence), I must agree with the 
plaintiffs‘ contention that the individual mandate regulates inactivity. Section 1501 states in 
relevant part: ―If an applicable individual fails to [buy health insurance], there is hereby 
imposed a penalty.‖ By its very own terms, therefore, the statute applies to a person who does 
not buy the government-approved insurance; that is, a person who ―fails‖ to act pursuant to 
the congressional dictate. . . . And because activity is required under the Commerce Clause, 
the individual mandate exceeds Congress‘ commerce power, as it is understood, defined, and 
applied in the existing Supreme Court case law. 
Id. at *23, *29. 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. VI. For a more detailed discussion, see supra note 11, as well as infra 
discussion in this section. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. VI. ―A fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Congress has the 
power to preempt state law.‖ Crosby v. Nat‘l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
Express preemption exists simply where the federal law in question contains ―an express provision for 
preemption‖ of related state laws. Id. Field preemption will be found where ―Congress intends federal 
law to ‗occupy the field‘‖ of the regulation in question. Id. (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 
U.S. 93, 100 (1989)). Conflict preemption may occur in one of two ways: ―where it is impossible for a 
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Either field preemption or conflict preemption could be found in the 
case of Prop C. Type-1 conflict preemption is the most immediately 
obvious answer to the question of how, if at all, Prop C is preempted by 
the federal health care law, since it seems clear that no citizen could 
simultaneously ―deny‖ the federal government‘s authority to impose tax 
penalties on individuals without health care and comply with a law 
imposing those same tax penalties.
54
 A court could also find type-2 
conflict preemption. Title I of the Patient Protection and Affordable Health 
Care Act, which contains the objectionable minimum coverage 
requirements,
55
 is titled, ―Quality, Affordable Health Care for All 
Americans.‖56 The use of ―All Americans‖ in this title indicates the 
intended scope of Congress‘s reform and suggests that a law exempting 
certain Americans from certain provisions of the bill would constitute an 
―obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress‖ under Crosby—the primary purpose being attainment of health 
care coverage for all Americans.
57
 Finally, the expansive and 
comprehensive nature of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
could be read as evincing intent to ―occupy the field‖ of health insurance, 
rendering Prop C invalid due to field preemption.
58
 
B. Typical Judicial Evaluation of Popularly Enacted Laws 
Something that a court may—and perhaps should—consider before 
embarking on a standard preemption analysis of Prop C, however, is the 
following: should the fact that the law was popularly enacted, rather than 
passed by the Missouri state legislature, render it subject to a different 
level of judicial analysis?
59
 The plebiscite origin of laws has typically not 
 
 
private party to comply with both state and federal law,‖ or ―where ‗under the circumstances of [a] 
particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.‘‖ Id. at 372–73 (alterations in original) (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). Hereinafter, I refer to these two modes of conflict preemption 
as ―type-1 conflict preemption‖ and ―type-2 conflict preemption,‖ respectively. 
 54. H.B. 1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010); Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).  
 55. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501. 
 56. Id. § 1(b) (emphasis added). 
 57. Id.; see Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.  
 58. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372 (quoting ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 100). 
 59. See supra note 13. Mark Tushnet has described the possibility of ―[d]ifferential judicial 
review of direct legislation‖ as follows:  
In some cases, the courts might be more aggressive in reviewing direct legislation. In other 
words, they might apply intermediate or strict scrutiny to direct legislation that would elicit 
only mere rationality review were it adopted by a legislature. Alternatively, they might be less 
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been a factor in Supreme Court evaluations of those laws for 
constitutionality under the Supremacy Clause or otherwise.
60
 Essentially, 
the Court evaluates a law on its face without regard to the process that 
created the law.
61
 Thus, if a court were to evaluate Prop C for preemption 
by the federal health care law tomorrow, it is unlikely that the popular 
origins of Prop C would affect or alter the standard federal preemption 
analysis.
62
 
IV. APPLICATION OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OR A PRESUMPTION 
AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALITY 
A. The Presumption Against Constitutionality 
One school of thought suggests that the non-constitutional origins
63
 of 
popular lawmaking should elicit a heightened or enhanced level of judicial 
scrutiny when the products of such lawmaking are analyzed for 
 
 
aggressive, applying rationality review to direct legislation that would elicit intermediate or 
strict scrutiny were it adopted by a legislature. 
Tushnet, supra note 13, at 373 (footnote omitted). Tushnet‘s description pertains primarily to an 
analysis of popularly enacted laws that touch on areas of protected individual rights or similar topics; 
the pertinent differences between such an analysis and the federal preemption analysis will be explored 
infra Part IV. 
 60. Chief Justice Burger explained, ―It is irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body 
enacted [this law] because the voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot 
measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation.‖ Citizens Against Rent 
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981), quoted in Eule, 
supra note 13, at 1505–06. As Eule noted, 
Judicial opinions resolving constitutional challenges to laws enacted by plebiscite seldom 
explicitly address the matter of the appropriate standard of review. The unspoken assumption, 
however, seems to be that the analysis need not vary as a result of the law‘s popular origin. 
The nearly three dozen Supreme Court cases reviewing ballot propositions contain scarcely a 
word on the subject. 
Eule, supra note 13, at 1505; see also id., at 1505 n.5 (listing, inter alia, City of Eastlake v. Forest City 
Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 
393 U.S. 385 (1969)). 
 61. Presumably, the Court does still examine the process through which a law was created 
inasmuch as the legislative history of a law tends to aid in statutory interpretation. 
 62. Thus, Prop C would simply be evaluated under the standard preemption framework discussed 
supra Part III.A. 
 63. I use the word ―non-constitutional‖ to describe popular lawmaking because, of course, the 
structures and processes used to conduct such lawmaking are described nowhere in the Federal 
Constitution. This should not be confused with calling popular lawmaking unconstitutional, which 
would be to characterize it not only as outside constitutionally-defined government structures, but as 
actually in direct conflict with constitutional mandates. While the argument has been made that 
popular lawmaking is ―unconstitutional‖ under the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, see discussion infra 
this section, that argument is not relevant here, as presumably a finding that popular lawmaking is 
unconstitutional per se would render any further judicial evaluation of the law produced by such 
lawmaking moot. 
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constitutionality.
64
 Because popular lawmaking happens outside the 
standard, constitutionally dictated legislative channels, they are 
―constitutionally suspect‖ and should thus be scrutinized more carefully by 
a reviewing judicial body.
65
 
Professor Julian Eule has suggested that, in reviewing the 
constitutionality of popularly enacted laws, the judiciary should do away 
with any deference that might otherwise be given to the products of 
standard state legislative processes.
66
 He states: ―In a sense, I am 
proposing a new paragraph for the Carolene Products footnote: a fourth 
situation where the presumption of constitutionality should be relaxed. On 
occasions when the people eschew representation, courts need to protect 
the Constitution‘s representational values.‖67 In other words, a law 
produced via the non-constitutional popular lawmaking process should 
trigger the same heightened judicial scrutiny as a law interfering with the 
constitutionally protected right to free speech. Neither one is per se 
invalid, but both are constitutionally suspect.
68
  
 
 
 64. As Eule contends: 
[A]ny evaluation of the appropriate scope of judicial review under the United States 
Constitution is highly dependent on the nature of the particular body and process that 
produces the governmental act under attack. On occasion we are sensitive to this need to 
contextualize. For example, in a system resting upon the principle of national supremacy, 
Federal judicial review of state legislation is generally seen as raising different questions than 
the oversight of congressional action. Judicial review of the plebiscite has not profited from 
such a sensitivity. Yet . . . a constitutional framework with a normative preference for 
representative government demands that we conceptualize a different judicial role when the 
law under review emanates from the electorate rather than a legislative body. 
Eule, supra note 13, at 1533; see also Charlow, supra note 13, at 533–54 (―The proposition that there 
is a constitutional problem with plebiscites stems from the idea that although our government derives 
its ultimate legitimacy from the will of the people, majoritarianism is not the central premise on which 
our government is based.‖). 
 65. Charlow, supra note 13, at 541. 
 66. Eule, supra note 13, at 1533–39. 
 67. Id. at 1558–59 (footnote omitted). The relevant portion of the footnote reads as follows: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . . 
[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to 
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation . . . [may] be subjected to more exacting judicial 
scrutiny. . . .[Strict scrutiny may also apply to] statutes directed at particular religious, or 
national, or racial minorities . . . .  
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), quoted in Eule, supra note 13, 
at 1533 n.248 (quote edited by author). The Carolene Products footnote is a celebrated and frequently 
cited framework that some believe may ―provide a principled basis for judicial intervention to protect 
minorities.‖ GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 523, 524 (6th ed. 2009). 
 68. As Eule clarifies: ―In the end, my claim is that direct democracy is constitutionally suspect, 
not impermissible. It triggers a harder judicial look.‖ Eule, supra note 13, at 1545. 
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Of course, unlike the analysis of rights-burdening legislation 
envisioned by Justice Stone in Carolene Products, analysis of state laws 
for potential preemption by federal laws involves not a balancing of 
interests, but rather a process of statutory interpretation to identify 
potential conflicts.
69
 Thus, the progression from standard to heightened 
scrutiny is not as linear in the context of federal preemption analysis. 
For purposes of federal preemption analysis, heightened scrutiny could 
take the form of a presumption against constitutionality that states would 
have to rebut for potentially preempted popular legislation to stand.
70
 Such 
a rebuttal could take the form of a demonstration that the state has a 
unique regulatory interest in the matter at hand, for example, or perhaps a 
showing of how the federal and state laws may complement each other 
sufficiently to overcome concerns about type-2 conflict preemption or 
field preemption.
71
 Primarily, a presumption against constitutionality 
could operate procedurally to place the entire burden of proof of 
constitutionality on the state in cases where type-2 conflict preemption or 
field preemption is implicated.
72
 It could also operate to require that courts 
 
 
 69. See discussion supra Part III. The differential levels of analysis for rights-burdening 
legislation are as follows: 
In a typical case, the court employs very deferential rational basis review to assess the 
constitutionality of the actions of the legislative branch. It will only overturn the legislative 
result as violative of the equal protection guarantee if the legislature has sought a goal that is 
not ―legitimate,‖ or has attempted to achieve a legitimate goal by means that do not represent 
a rational method of securing that goal. In contrast, when using strict scrutiny review the 
court requires that the law under examination be enacted to achieve a compelling government 
interest, and that the means chosen by the legislature to achieve that interest be necessary. 
Charlow, supra note 13, at 595 (footnotes omitted); see also discussion supra note 59. As Tushnet 
describes it, the plebiscite origin of a law would shift it either forwards or backwards on the scrutiny 
continuum. See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 373. However, preemption analysis involves not a 
continuum, but rather a set of categories for preemption, each of which involves a qualitatively 
different process of statutory interpretation. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 70. I propose the phrase ―presumption against constitutionality‖ to contrast with DuVivier‘s 
proposed ―presumption against preemption.‖ See DuVivier, supra note 15, at 224. For further 
discussion of DuVivier‘s proposal, see infra Part V. My phrase also contrasts with the ―presumption of 
constitutionality‖ afforded to non-problematic state laws in the Carolene Products footnote. See 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4; see also discussion supra note 67. 
 71. In Maine v. Taylor, for example, the Court upheld a Maine law regulating the sale of baitfish 
despite the burden the law placed on interstate commerce because Maine had unique knowledge of the 
ecosystems of its waterways and a clear need to protect those ecosystems. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 
U.S. 131 (1986). Although Maine v. Taylor is really a dormant Commerce Clause case, concerning 
whether or not a state may promulgate regulations that tend to impinge upon interstate commerce, it 
provides a nice example of a case in which a state has a unique regulatory interest. 
 72. Presumptions operating to shift burdens of proof may be observed in other areas of law. In 
corporate law, for example, the business judgment rule operates as a presumption that ―in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.‖ Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Once invoked by the directors of a corporation, ―[t]he burden is on the 
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construe any statutory ambiguity in favor of preemption (as opposed to in 
favor of constitutionality) in cases where express preemption or type-1 
conflict preemption is implicated.
73
 
Eule has suggested a two-part form of heightened judicial review that 
takes into account and corrects for differences among popular lawmaking 
processes.
74
 First, Eule categorizes a plebiscite as either substitutive or 
complementary.
75
 Second, he scrutinizes the specific processes that lead to 
the passage of the plebiscite to a varying degree depending on which 
category it falls into.  
Substitutive plebiscites are initiated by voters, who must gather a 
requisite number of signatures in order to place their proposed law on the 
ballot.
76
 Complementary plebiscites, by contrast, initiate with the state 
 
 
party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.‖ Id. The presumption 
against constitutionality would operate similarly in the case of field or type-2 conflict preemption, both 
of which seem to allow room for argument that the state law in question can coexist with the federal 
law. Express or type-1 conflict preemption, by contrast, involves a more explicit, and thus less easily 
overcome, conflict between state and federal law. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 73. It is a canon of statutory interpretation that, wherever possible, courts should construe 
ambiguities in a law in such a way as to maintain the law‘s constitutionality; this would simply involve 
resolving ambiguities in the opposite way where plebiscites are involved. See, e.g., Sinking-Fund 
Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878).  
It is our duty, when required in the regular course of judicial proceedings, to declare an act of 
Congress void if not within the legislative power of the United States; but this declaration 
should never be made except in a clear case. Every possible presumption is in favor of the 
validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational doubt. 
One branch of the government cannot encroach on the domain of another without danger. The 
safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict observance of this salutary 
rule. 
Id. at 718. Again, I distinguish type-1 conflict and express preemption from other types of preemption 
because they both appear to foreclose the possibility of reconciling conflicting federal and state law, 
where found. See discussion supra note 72. If the federal law‘s language is indeed found to expressly 
preempt state law, there is no room for a showing that the laws can be reconciled; if one law renders 
compliance with another impossible, the result is similar. Thus, judicial scrutiny for these types of 
preemption is more readily heightened by expanding the reach of statutory interpretation than by 
burden-shifting. 
 74. Eule, supra note 13, at 1510–13, 1572–75. Given that Eule‘s primary objection to popularly 
enacted laws is the non-constitutional processes that create them, it makes sense that his proposed 
method of judicial review would account for varying degrees of non-constitutionality in those 
processes. 
 75. Id. at 1510–13. 
 76. Eule describes substitutive plebiscites as 
direct democracy in its purest current form. Here the voters can completely bypass the 
legislative and executive branches of government. . . . [T]he states and municipalities that 
permit this kind of direct democracy have a primary representational form of governance but 
afford voters the opportunity to substitute plebiscites for the ordinary process of lawmaking. 
In order to exercise this option the voters neither need legislative permission nor legislative 
assistance. A measure may be placed on the ballot by securing a specified number of 
signatures—usually set at some percentage of the votes cast in the preceding general 
election—and the measure is enacted if a majority of the voters signify their approval. 
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legislature and may then be either approved or vetoed by voters.
77
 Eule‘s 
primary objection to substitutive plebiscites is that, almost by definition, 
they represent raw majority sentiment and may thus tend to trample the 
rights of minority groups.
78
 It is this potentially rights-trampling feature of 
substitutive direct democracy that Eule identifies as demanding the 
heightened scrutiny from Carolene Products.
79
 Essentially, under Eule‘s 
proposed analysis, popular legislation that implicates individual rights or 
equal protection issues would receive heightened scrutiny for 
 
 
Id. at 1510. Eule includes both direct and indirect voter initiatives in this category. Id. at 1511. Direct 
initiatives require only a certain number of voter signatures and are then placed on the ballot for 
popular vote, while indirect initiatives go before the legislature for approval once they accrue the 
requisite number of signatures. See INITIATIVES: PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 15. 
Following an indirect initiative, the issue goes back to the voters if the legislature fails to act on it or 
rejects it; alternatively, the legislature may not be required to act on the initiative or may be able to 
amend it. Id. at 16.  
Fifteen states use only the direct initiative. Nine states use some form of the indirect initiative; 
five of the nine states that use the indirect initiative also use the direct initiative in some way 
or another. If you study the number of times the initiative has been used in the various states, 
it is obvious that the states who use the direct initiative use it much more than the states that 
use the indirect initiative. 
Id. Within Eule‘s analysis, 
it is largely irrelevant which form of the initiative is used, so long as the voters ultimately 
vote on the measure. If the legislature adopts an indirect initiative, the resulting law should be 
seen as a product of representative government, not direct democracy. But, if the legislature 
rejects it, the ensuing voter effort must be considered substitutive. Since the legislature may 
not prevent the measure from being placed on the ballot, the voters still retain the ultimate 
right to displace completely the representational framework for lawmaking and substitute a 
direct one. The process simply takes a little longer.  
Eule, supra note 13, at 1511 (footnote omitted). 
 77. Complementary plebiscites involve 
an additional tier. This form of direct democracy is commonly called a referendum because 
the legislation is referred to the electorate for ratification. Here the voters and the legislature 
must act in concert before a law may take effect. Legislative passage is prerequisite but 
inadequate: Without voter endorsement the legislative effort fails; without legislative passage 
the electorate has nothing to vote on. 
Eule, supra note 13, at 1512 (footnote omitted). Thus, complementary plebiscites are still properly 
viewed as exercises of direct democracy. 
 78.  
Our worst tendencies toward prejudice . . . are chastened in legislative debate. . . . The 
substitutive plebiscite, on the other hand, has little capacity for deliberation. Public debate is 
infrequent. Exposure to minority perspectives occurs accidentally if at all. Voters may be 
confused and overwhelmed by the issues placed before them. Any efforts at self-education are 
thwarted by manipulative campaigns designed to oversimplify the issues and appeal to the 
electorate‘s worst instincts. Most important, voters register their decisions in the privacy of 
the voting booth. They are unaccountable to others for their preferences and their biases. 
Their individual commitment to a consistent and fair course of conduct can be neither 
measured nor questioned. 
Id. at 1555–56. 
 79. See supra note 67. 
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discriminatory purpose, since popularly enacted laws are not entitled to the 
same deference to the law‘s stated purpose as are traditionally enacted 
laws.
80
  
By contrast, under Eule‘s approach, complementary plebiscites are 
―birds of a different feather‖ that seem not to demand heightened judicial 
scrutiny because their ―filtering‖ through the legislature presumably 
corrects for much of the rights-trampling that raw majority will might 
otherwise result in.
81
 However, Eule distinguishes between positive 
complementary plebiscites and negative complementary plebiscites.
82
 A 
positive complementary plebiscite, in which voters ratify the decision of a 
legislature, raises none of the concerns about unfiltered majority will and 
thus does not trigger the heightened scrutiny necessitated by substitutive 
plebiscites.
83
 A negative complementary plebiscite, by contrast, involves a 
pure majority veto of legislature-enacted law and may thus ―pose a 
distinctive threat of majority tyranny‖ that should prompt heightened 
judicial scrutiny.
84
  
To summarize, Eule‘s proposed approach involves the judiciary 
applying Carolene Products heightened scrutiny to all popular lawmaking 
 
 
 80.  
Because the harder look is prompted by a concern for individual rights and equal application 
of laws, it is principally in these areas that the courts should treat substitutive plebiscites with 
particular suspicion. . . . This raises the problematic question of how to measure 
discrimination against minorities. . . . Two approaches are possible. We may relax the burden 
of proving discriminatory purpose and be more imaginative about the sources we canvass—
for example, ballot pamphlets, exit polls, campaign advertising—or we may abandon the 
purpose requirement altogether in certain plebiscitary settings. 
Eule, supra note 13, at 1559–62. 
 81. Id. at 1573. 
 82. Id. at 1573–74. 
 83. Id. at 1574 (―When voters ratify the legislative choice, judicial deference is well deserved. 
The statutory product reflects extraordinary consensus. A filtered legislative result has received 
popular endorsement. Supporters of participatory democracy and representative government can join 
hands to celebrate the result.‖).  
 84. Id. at 1575.  
When voters veto the legislative choice there is no electoral-legislative consensus. The 
participatory and representative processes arrive at competing conclusions and the electorate 
prevails. In the sense that it bypasses the legislative result, the ―negative‖ complementary 
plebiscite operates very much like the substitutive plebiscite. . . . Complementary plebiscites 
enable popular majorities to prevent legislation that minorities have managed to convince 
legislative majorities to enact. Sometimes legislative sensitivity to minority interests, as well 
as debts incurred by the process of logrolling and compromise, result in minorities‘ being able 
to assert their legislative power in a positive rather than negative manner. Where the 
minority‘s legislative victory takes the form of passing rather than preventing legislation, 
complementary plebiscites—which make lawmaking more difficult—may deserve enhanced 
judicial attention. 
Id. at 1574–75. 
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that (a) is not ―filtered‖ through legislative consensus, and (b) burdens 
individual rights or equal protection. The more attenuated from 
constitutionally dictated legislative structures the popular lawmaking 
process gets, the more constitutionally suspect the products of that process 
become, thus meriting heightened judicial scrutiny. This two-part analysis 
could be combined with the presumption against constitutionality to 
provide a workable standard for differential judicial review of plebiscites 
that come under federal preemption analysis. In the context of federal 
preemption analysis, as opposed to rights-burdening analysis, the judiciary 
could simply apply the presumption against constitutionality to all 
popularly enacted laws that display the first criterion in Eule‘s analysis 
(while retaining standard preemption analysis for positive complementary 
plebiscites).  
B. Why the Presumption Against Constitutionality Is Desirable 
As noted above, one of the primary objections scholars have made to 
popularly enacted laws is that the processes that create them have no 
constitutional basis.
85
 Clearly, the Federal Constitution does not prescribe 
lawmaking processes for the states; however, the described federal 
legislative process
86
 coupled with the Guaranty Clause
87
 suggests that state 
legislative processes should be at least somewhat analogous to their 
federal counterpart.
88
 Indeed, there is evidence that direct democracy was 
not only not included in the Constitution, but that it was anathema to the 
very system the Framers were attempting to create.
89
 Exclusion of the 
 
 
 85. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 88. As Eule puts it, ―a constitutional framework with a normative preference for representative 
government demands that we conceptualize a different judicial role when the law under review 
emanates from the electorate rather than a legislative body.‖ Eule, supra note 13, at 1533. For more on 
the Guaranty Clause as it relates to popular lawmaking, refer to the discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 89.  
If the Constitution‘s Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a bizarre manner 
of demonstrating their affection. The Federalist No. 10 hardly qualifies as an ode to the 
virtues of simple majoritarianism. . . . Madison directs his venom at the threat of factions, 
―whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole,‖ but the latter, he believed, could 
be restrained ―by regular vote.‖. . . Majority factions were far more to be feared, willing as 
they might be to sacrifice ―the public good and the rights of other citizens‖ to their ―ruling 
passion or interest.‖ This theme runs throughout The Federalist. ―If a majority be united by a 
common interest,‖ wrote Madison in The Federalist No. 51, ―the rights of the minority will 
be insecure.‖  
Id. at 1522 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961), and THE 
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)). Moreover, ―[a]s Charles Beard has 
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majority from direct participation in government may have been what ―the 
Federalists believed might permit our government to succeed where other 
democracies had failed.‖90  
This conflict between direct democracy and constitutional principles is 
heightened by the Guaranty Clause of Article IV, which states, ―The 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Form of Government . . . .‖91 The presence of the Guaranty Clause 
indicates that the highly representative, non-participatory federal 
government described in the Constitution was intended as a blueprint for 
state governments as well—a blueprint whose terms the federal 
government, including the judiciary, is empowered to enforce.
92
 In its 
strongest form, this argument contends that any popular lawmaking 
activity is expressly unconstitutional under the Guaranty Clause.
93
 
However, the Supreme Court effectively silenced Guaranty Clause 
challenges to popular lawmaking in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph 
Company v. Oregon.
94
 
 
 
cynically noted, simple direct majority rule ‗was undoubtedly more odious to most of the delegates to 
the Convention than was slavery.‘‖ Id. at 1522–23 (quoting DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 29 (C. Beard & B. Schultz eds., 1912)). 
 90. Id. at 1526. 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 92.  
The Constitution is not silent on the structure of state government. Article IV explicitly 
imposes an obligation on the United States—a term that ordinarily includes the judiciary—to 
―guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.‖ The message 
appears clear. The clause says ―Republican,‖ not ―Democratic.‖ If we harbor any doubt about 
the difference, Madison is there to help out. ―Democracy,‖ he informs us, consists ―of a small 
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person.‖ ―A Republic,‖ 
in contrast, is ―a Government in which the scheme of representation takes place.‖ The 
distinction is precisely what Madison hoped would bring the success that eluded earlier free 
societies. It is unlikely that the word ―Republican‖ was loosely used. It came with a history 
and symbolized a vision. Its inclusion in Article IV is best understood as transporting that 
vision to the states. This interpretation is substantially bolstered by the consistent use of the 
term ―Legislature‖ whenever the Constitution confers power on state government. 
Eule, supra note 13, at 1539–40 (footnotes omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61–62 
(James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 93. For a list of scholarship advancing this thesis, see Clark, supra note 3, at 438 n.13, including 
Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against 
Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19 (1993), and Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, “And To the 
Republic for Which It Stands”: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 1057 (1996). 
 94. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). This case involved a challenge 
by an Oregon telephone company to a new tax law promulgated in accordance with a 1902 amendment 
to Oregon‘s Constitution, which stated the following: 
But the people reserve to themselves power to propose law and amendments to the 
Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislative 
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There are two primary counterarguments to these historical and 
structuralist objections to popular lawmaking. First, the Framers‘ 
generation did have a healthy respect for the sanctity of the popular 
voice—a respect evident in the same Federalist Papers in which Madison 
denounced majoritarian tyranny.
95
 Second, a more practical argument is 
that the use of popular lawmaking has become so entrenched in many state 
governments that it makes little sense to only now begin wielding the 
Guaranty Clause as a sword against it.
96
 
 
 
assembly, and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act 
of the legislative assembly. 
Id. at 133–34 (quoting OR. CONST. art. 4, § 1). In challenging the tax law, Pacific Telephone alleged 
the following: 
 II. The initiative amendment and the tax in question, levied pursuant to a measure passed 
by authority of the initiative amendment, violates the right to a republican form of 
government which is guaranteed by § 4, article 4 of the Federal Constitution. . . . 
 V. The Federal Constitution presupposes in each state the maintenance of a republican 
form of government and the existence of state legislatures, to wit: Representative assemblies 
having the power to make the laws; and that in each state the powers of government will be 
divided into three departments: a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. One of these, the 
legislature, is destroyed by the initiative. 
Id. at 137–39 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4). After musing at length on ―the anomalous and 
destructive effects upon both the state and national governments‖ that finding Oregon‘s popular 
lawmaking amendment unconstitutional would have, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear 
this claim. Id. at 141–51. 
As the issues presented, in their very essence, are, and have long since by this court been, 
definitely determined to be political and governmental, and embraced within the scope of the 
powers conferred upon Congress, and not, therefore, within the reach of judicial power, it 
follows that the case presented is not within our jurisdiction, and the writ of error must 
therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
Id. at 151. 
 95. In describing the scope and importance of judicial review, Hamilton stressed that the laws 
enacted via constitutionally prescribed legislative processes were still subject to invalidation if they 
conflicted with the Constitution—not simply because the Constitution trumps other laws, but because 
the Constitution represents popular will. See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78: The 
Judiciary Department, INDEP. J., June 14, 1788, available at www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm. 
―[T]he power of the people is superior to both [the judiciary and the legislature]; and that where the 
will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the 
Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former.‖ Id. Moreover, 
Hamilton states that it is the people, and not their representatives, who ultimately retain the power to 
alter the Constitution ―whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness.‖ Id. While the 
constitutionally dictated procedure for amendment does not actually allow for direct popular input, 
Hamilton‘s essay does suggest that a robust form of popular input is not necessarily incompatible with 
the basic structural tenets of a republican, federalist government. 
 96. Commentators have noted how significant popular lawmaking has become among the states. 
―There seemed to be fairly widespread agreement [at a California conference regarding the use of 
ballot initiatives] that the initiative had become more important in the law making process than in the 
legislature.‖ INITIATIVES: PROGRAM PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 5. A reluctance to wholly 
invalidate the process of popular lawmaking—and thereby its products—is evident in the Court‘s 
reluctance to rule on the Guaranty Clause issue presented in Pacific States. See Pacific States, 223 
U.S. at 151; see also discussion supra note 94. 
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Apart from the immediate constitutional conflicts, various 
commentators have identified a number of more pragmatic concerns raised 
by popular lawmaking that could indicate a need for greater judicial 
moderation of such lawmaking. First, plebiscites tend to lack the 
―deliberative process‖ that characterizes and lends validity to legislature-
enacted laws.
97
 Plebiscites look more like statements of raw voter reaction 
to a topic than a calculated regulatory response to that topic.
98
 Second, the 
majoritarian voting process is highly manipulable.
99
 Third, as noted supra, 
lawmaking that is purely expressive of the majority may be rights-
trampling for minority voters.
100
 This feature in particular seems to 
demand an enhanced judicial role in policing the products of popular 
lawmaking, as it may be that ―the judiciary stands alone in guarding 
against the evils incident to transient, impassioned majorities that the 
Constitution seeks to dissipate.‖101  
There are also other, more basic procedural flaws in the popular 
lawmaking process that may make its products more suspect from a 
judicial standpoint than those of traditional legislative processes.
102
 These 
include ―low and uneven voter turnout, voter ignorance, the influence of 
money, and special-interest capture.‖103 Interestingly, Professor Sherman 
 
 
 97.  
Our worst tendencies toward prejudice . . . are chastened in legislative debate. Knowledge and 
exposure are effective weapons against prejudice. Debate and deliberation inevitably lead to 
better informed judgment. Enlarging one‘s exposure to competing ideas and perspectives 
induces greater sensitivity and checks partiality. Legislative hearings and the testimony of 
various interest groups widen the legislator‘s horizon. But hearings are only a part of 
legislative education. Perhaps a more important factor in generating empathy is the diversity 
of the legislature‘s membership itself. . . . Group representation ensures that diverse views are 
continually expressed, increasing ―the likelihood that political outcomes will incorporate 
some understanding of the perspectives of all those affected.‖  
Eule, supra note 13, at 1555 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1588 (1989)). 
 98. For an extensive and nuanced discussion of the difference between raw majority sentiment 
and true popular will, see Clark, supra note 3. See also discussion of Eule‘s position supra notes 74–
80. 
 99. ―Popular masses too quickly form preferences, fail adequately to consider the interests of 
others, and are overly susceptible to contagious passions and the deceit of eloquent and ambitious 
leaders.‖ Eule, supra note 13, at 1526–27. Prop C was criticized by its opponents as a manipulation of 
conservative voter sentiment in anticipation of the upcoming midterm elections. See discussion supra 
Part II. 
 100. Eule, supra note 13, at 1551–55; Charlow, supra note 13, at 534–38. 
 101. Eule, supra note 13, at 1525. 
 102. Clark, supra note 3, at 439. 
 103. Id. (footnotes omitted). One potential response to concerns about voter turnout and education 
is that a low voter turnout may actually be desirable if only some voters are going to be educated. 
Commentators have observed that ―[t]here is a relationship . . . between education and turnout. The 
electoral process is self selecting [sic] [in the context of voter lawmaking].‖ INITIATIVES: PROGRAM 
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Clark has suggested that, in addition to making popularly enacted laws 
constitutionally suspect, these procedural flaws may even undermine the 
goals of popular lawmaking itself because the voting process fails to 
account for the intensity and relative priority of voter preferences.
104
 Thus, 
the argument goes, since direct democracy fails to even achieve its 
ostensible goal of creating legislation that speaks to genuine majority will, 
its products merit no judicial deference and should be viewed with 
suspicion.
105
  
To sum up, there are a number of worthwhile arguments in support of 
the proposition that the products of popular lawmaking should merit 
heightened judicial scrutiny—in the case of federal preemption analysis, a 
presumption against constitutionality. There is substantial historical and 
textual evidence that popular lawmaking defies important constitutional 
principles;
106
 plebiscites are not as rigorously produced as traditionally 
enacted laws;
107
 even the apparent statement of majority will contained in 
a plebiscite may be garbled and distorted due to procedural flaws.
108
 Prop 
C lends credence to all of these arguments. Indeed, the constitutionally 
problematic nature of popular lawmaking is thrown into relief by the very 
content of Prop C: it seems dubious, at the very least, that a small group of 
voters in a state should be entitled to question a law created via 
constitutionally sanctioned federal processes. Moreover, although there 
was some input from the state legislature in placing Prop C on the 
Missouri ballot, it is difficult to characterize what was essentially a flat-out 
rejection of federal regulation as the kind of measured state regulatory 
decision that would ordinarily merit deference under the Sinking-Fund 
 
 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 44. If this is the case, then voter lawmaking is not simply an unfiltered 
snapshot of broad, visceral majority preference, but is rather a survey of a focus group of informed 
citizens expressing a legislative preference. This does not seem so drastically attenuated from 
traditional lawmaking processes. 
 104. Clark, supra note 3, at 448–73. The ―messy, real-world practice of direct democracy‖ tends 
to ―undermine the responsiveness of direct democracy‖ such that ―an initiative or referendum outcome 
might not reveal what a deliberate, thoughtful majority of the whole voting population would want if 
they had a full understanding of the issue at hand.‖ Id. at 439–40. 
 105. The most obvious response to this is that low voter turnout, noted above, may actually be an 
―effective mechanism for reflecting relative intensity of preference,‖ since ―those who have little 
interest in the outcome will simply not vote at all.‖ Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and 
Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 968 (1998), quoted in Clark, 
supra note 3, at 469–70. See discussion supra Part IV.B. An alternative, more succinct response might 
be this: ―In the end, enumerating the plebiscite‘s flaws . . . can carry us only so far. Regardless of the 
many ways in which plebiscites garble the message of majority will, it would be difficult to argue 
convincingly that legislators convey it more clearly.‖ Eule, supra note 13, at 1521. 
 106. See discussion supra notes 86–94. 
 107. See discussion supra notes 97–101. 
 108. See discussion supra notes 102–105. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2011] MISSOURI‘S HEALTH CARE BATTLE 229 
 
 
 
 
Cases.
109
 Prop C was also the product of a highly targeted campaign that 
resulted in a primarily Republican voter turnout.
110
 As Prop C illustrates, 
popular lawmaking is flawed in a number of ways that may yield laws of 
questionable validity—laws suggesting a need for, or perhaps even 
demanding, increased judicial scrutiny when examined for 
constitutionality. 
V. APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE OR A PRESUMPTION AGAINST 
PREEMPTION 
A. The Presumption Against Preemption 
By contrast, Professor K.K. DuVivier has suggested that differential 
judicial review of popularly enacted laws should take the form of a 
―presumption against preemption,‖ or ―an enhanced review that requires a 
greater effort to reconcile the ballot initiative with the federal regulatory 
scheme.‖111 DuVivier identifies three factors inherent to the type of 
plebiscite that she believes should be entitled to a judicial presumption 
against preemption: ―(a) topic areas that have traditionally been regulated 
by the states, such as health and safety; (b) good candidates for 
experimentation at the state level when there is no need for national 
uniformity; and (c) matters that expand the rights of individuals without 
infringing on the rights of others.‖112 Where a plebiscite exhibits all three 
of these factors, DuVivier believes, it should receive ―greater deference in 
preemption analysis.‖113 Thus, DuVivier‘s proposed differential standard 
of judicial review for the products of popular lawmaking is a two-step 
process: (1) categorization as either exhibiting or not exhibiting the 
 
 
 109. See supra note 73. 
 110. See discussion supra notes 46–47. 
 111. DuVivier, supra note 15, at 224–25. DuVivier discusses ―ballot initiatives,‖ rather than 
plebiscites in general, but her argument is applicable to all forms of popular lawmaking. The 
presumption against preemption, like the presumption against constitutionality, operates as a form of 
differential judicial review in the context of federal preemption analysis, where scrutiny cannot be 
heightened or relaxed in as linear a fashion as it can in the context of, for example, rights-protective 
analysis. See discussion supra note 69. 
 112. DuVivier, supra note 15, at 248. The ―alignment‖ of all three factors in a single ballot 
initiative is both necessary and sufficient to entitle the law to a presumption against preemption in 
DuVivier‘s scheme. 
 113. Id. at 254. DuVivier identifies these categories as representative of ―social issues,‖ and 
argues that a presumption against preemption ―encourages experimentation and seeks to limit the use 
of preemption to arrest the process.‖ Id. Thus, her proposed factors may be seen as reflective of a 
normative judgment that social experimentation is valuable to society as a whole rather than a 
procedural or structural preference for specific types of lawmaking. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:207 
 
 
 
 
desired factors, and (2) application of a presumption against preemption to 
laws that fall within the specific preferred category.
114
  
The presumption against preemption has traditionally been applied by 
the Supreme Court in the context of laws representing areas of ―intimate 
concern‖ to the states.115 As Justice Frankfurter wrote:  
[D]ue regard for our federalism, in its practical operation, favors 
survival of the reserved authority of a State over matters that are the 
intimate concern of the State unless Congress has clearly swept the 
boards of all State authority, or the State‘s claim is in unmistakable 
conflict with what Congress has ordered.
116
  
An example of the Court applying the presumption against preemption can 
be found in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.
117
 In Medtronic, the Court asserted 
 
 
 114. Tushnet has criticized the use of categorization of popularly enacted laws on three grounds:  
 (a) Differential standards of judicial review matter, not in connection with all public 
policies, but in connection only with those that the polity actually pursues through direct or 
representative legislation. With respect to this subset of public policy, differential standards of 
judicial review matter only when the laws raise nontrivial, federal constitutional questions. 
Therefore, the categories we develop must subdivide an already restricted set of public 
policies. 
 (b) Any categories that emerge are likely to be ill-defined. This would allow judges to 
place cases into categories of more or less aggressive review depending on their personal 
views of which standard is justified. 
 (c) By their nature, such categories of legislation would be both over- and under-
inclusive. Even with well-defined categories, we will always be able to find a case placed in 
the category of aggressive judicial review where, upon full consideration, only ordinary 
judicial review was justified. 
Tushnet, supra note 13, at 376. While it seems undesirable to reject an otherwise appropriate standard 
of judicial review simply because it poses administrative difficulties, Tushnet‘s argument does have 
some bite in the context of DuVivier‘s proposed factors. Indeed, it seems as though any direct 
legislation that runs counter to prevailing legislative norms (which, presumably, would be the most 
constitutionally suspect direct legislation) could easily be classified as ―social experimentation‖ and 
thus become entitled to judicial deference. 
 115. DuVivier, supra note 15, at 258 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).  
 116. Rice, 331 U.S. at 241 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoted in DuVivier, supra note 15, at 258 
n.202. 
 117. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). In Medtronic, the Court held that state 
common-law claims against the manufacturer of a pacemaker were not preempted by a federal statute 
providing that: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State 
may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any 
requirement— 
 (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this 
chapter to the device, and 
 (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter. 
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that only the clear intent of Congress to preempt state law should be used 
to strike down an otherwise valid exercise of state police power.
118
 
Additionally, the Court emphasized that any clear congressional intent to 
preempt should be construed as narrowly as possible.
119
 In Hillsborough 
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc.,
120
 the Court also invoked 
―the presumption that state and local regulation of health and safety 
matters can constitutionally coexist with federal regulation.‖121 The 
Hillsborough decision observed that the presumption against preemption 
could be rebutted by more than just clear federal intent to preempt, 
holding: ―Even where Congress has not completely displaced state 
regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it 
actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when 
‗compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility.‘‖122 
Medtronic and Hillsborough demonstrate that limited forms of express 
and conflict preemption both still operate to overcome the presumption 
against preemption.
123
 However, more expansive forms of preemption, 
including field preemption, will not invalidate an exercise of state police 
power that is protected by the presumption against preemption.
124
  
 
 
Id. at 481–82 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k (YEAR)). Medtronic demonstrates the lengths to which the 
Court has gone to reconcile state law with federal law under the presumption against preemption. The 
Court allowed state damages claims despite strict statutory language regarding the circumstances 
under which a state requirement could be exempted, id. at 482 n.5, and existing precedent regarding 
the preemption of common-law claims by federal statutory regimes, id. at 487–88 (citing Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992)). Medtronic and Hillsborough County, discussed further infra Part 
V.A, were both cited extensively by DuVivier, supra note 15, at 13–14. 
 118. ―[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‖ Medtronic, 
518 U.S. at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985). 
 121. Id. at 716. The Hillsborough court upheld a local regulation imposing more stringent testing 
and record-keeping requirements on plasma collection centers than did a relevant portion of the 
Federal Public Health Service Act. Id. at 709–10, 712. 
 122. Id. at 713 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 
(1963)). 
 123. See discussion supra Part III.A. This also provides some support for my distinction between 
the presumption against constitutionality as applied in situations of express and type-1 conflict 
preemption on the one hand, and field and type-2 conflict preemption on the other. See supra notes 
72–73. 
 124. In Hillsborough, the Court stated:  
We reject the argument that an intent to pre-empt [sic] may be inferred from the 
comprehensiveness of the FDA‘s regulations at issue here. . . . Indeed, even in the absence of 
the 1973 statement [made by the FDA indicating that the regulations in question were not 
intended to usurp state authority], the comprehensiveness of the FDA‘s regulations would not 
justify pre-emption [sic]. . . . [M]erely because the federal provisions were sufficiently 
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It seems there are two theories under which one could extend the 
presumption against preemption, traditionally granted to exercises of state 
police power, to products of direct legislation: (1) the police power 
belonging to the electorate of a state is coextensive with that of traditional 
state lawmaking bodies,
125
 and (2) the right of citizens to express their 
preferences through voting is as fundamental as the right of state 
governments to regulate for the health, safety, morals, and general welfare 
of its citizens, and is therefore entitled to the same judicial deference.
126
  
 
 
comprehensive to meet the need identified by Congress did not mean that States and localities 
were barred from identifying additional needs or imposing further requirements in the 
field. . . . Given the presumption that state and local regulation related to matters of health and 
safety can normally coexist with federal regulations, we will seldom infer, solely from the 
comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt [sic] in its entirety a field 
related to health and safety. 
Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 716–18. Similarly, in Medtronic, despite the existence of explicit 
preemption language as well as a clearly defined procedure for obtaining an exemption to preemption, 
the Court still opted to construe the preemption language as narrowly as possible and declined to find 
that ―a state law of general applicability‖ not included among the twenty-two specifically enumerated 
exemptions was preempted. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 499–500. The Court characterized its narrow 
reading of express preemption language as ―consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic 
primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety.‖ Id. at 485. 
 125. DuVivier‘s proposed model of judicial deference is a limited version of this theory, as one of 
her proposed factors that would entitle a ballot initiative to the presumption against preemption is 
―topic areas that have traditionally been regulated by the states, such as health and safety.‖ DuVivier, 
supra note 13, at 248. One could choose to adopt either the limited DuVivier model of police powers 
belonging to the electorate, or adopt the view that the electorate‘s police powers are fully coextensive 
with those of state lawmaking bodies. Either way, the argument would be that the electorate of a state 
is qualified to exercise the state‘s police power in the same way as the legislature of that state. Thus, 
any exercise of state police power by means of popular vote (or, under DuVivier‘s model, exercises of 
state police power by popular vote that have added normative value to society) is entitled to the 
presumption against preemption just as a product of the legislature would be. This correlates the idea, 
expressed in Citizens Against Rent Control, that electorates and legislatures are equally 
constitutionally bounded when making laws. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing 
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); see supra note 60. Most popular lawmaking is 
authorized by an amendment to a state constitution. See JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, THE INITIATIVE: 
CITIZEN LAW-MAKING 23 (1999). Since popular lawmaking is thus textually incorporated into the 
structure of state government, it makes sense to assume that popular lawmaking is intended to have 
coextensive power with that government. However, many states do expressly limit what can be 
legislated by plebiscite. Id. at 29. This tends to weaken this argument, although at least twelve state 
high courts have held that popularly enacted laws should be liberally construed, and South Dakota 
actually requires such liberal construal by statute. Id. at 30. In the context of federal preemption, 
―traditional police powers of the State survive unless Congress has made a purpose to pre-empt [sic] 
them clear.‖ Gade v. Nat‘l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass‘n, 505 U.S. 88, 121–22 (1992) (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  
 126. Under this theory, the right of citizens to vote is treated as qualitatively different from the 
right of state lawmakers to exercise police power, but is nonetheless granted special status in the 
context of judicial review due to its fundamental nature. I base this potential theory primarily on The 
Federalist No. 78 thesis that the Constitution emanates from the people and that the people thus 
occupy a unique position of sovereignty within the constitutional scheme. See discussion supra note 
95. Thus, in response to the earlier-described arguments that the plebiscite is unconstitutional or, at the 
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Undoubtedly, the former of these theories is a preferable option for 
extending the presumption against preemption to the products of popular 
legislation, since it appears to have at least some grounding in 
constitutional text.
127
 The Tenth Amendment is regrettably silent on 
whether the ―States‖ to whom power is reserved may exercise that power 
by means of popularly enacted legislation.
128
 For purposes of this 
discussion, the remaining relevant inquiry is why it might be desirable to 
extend the presumption against preemption to plebiscites. 
B. Why the Presumption Against Preemption Is Desirable 
On a purely visceral level, the idea that the voice of the people should 
occupy a special position within political processes seems democratically 
appealing. Justice Hugo Black once characterized voter-enacted regulation 
as ―moving in the direction of letting the people of the State—the voters of 
the State—establish their policy, which is as near to a democracy as you 
can get.‖129 Other commentators have noted the instinctive appeal of 
allowing the voice of the people special deference.
130
 The European Union 
has endorsed the use of plebiscites along similar lines: ―The right of 
citizens to have their say in major decisions on long-term or virtually 
irreversible commitments involving a majority of citizens is one of the 
democratic principles common to all member States of the Council of 
Europe.‖131 Another reason to defer to the voice of the people for purposes 
of judicial review is Alexander Hamilton‘s venerable observation that ―the 
power of the people‖ is both prior and superior to constitutionally 
established government structures.
132
 
 
 
very least, non-constitutional, see supra Part IV, the argument could be made that the popular vote, 
instead, enjoys a sort of meta- or ur-constitutional status. See also discussion infra Part V.B. 
 127. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 128. Id. 
 129. 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
668 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975), quoted in Eule, supra note 13, at 1506. 
 130. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 3. ―The assumption is this: whatever one thinks about the 
propriety or wisdom of plebiscites, they at least do one thing—they let the people speak. In the words 
of the Supreme Court, direct democracy is designed to ‗give citizens a voice on questions of public 
policy.‘‖ Id. at 435 (quoting City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976)). 
 131. Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on 
Referendums and Popular Initiatives at Local Level, Recommendation No. R (96) 2, at 19 (1996), 
quoted in DuVivier, supra note 15, at 238. 
 132.  
[W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the 
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than 
the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by 
those which are not fundamental. . . . [I]n regard to the interfering acts of a superior and 
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Another argument in favor of judicial deference to plebiscites is that 
such laws may have greater practical value to society than traditional 
legislation because they offer an expedited legislative process and allow 
state policy to more clearly reflect community norms.
133
 DuVivier argues 
that ―[a]lthough criticism of initiatives is valid in many contexts, the 
benefits of some initiatives, at least some of those allowing social 
experimentation in health and safety, sufficiently outweigh the drawbacks 
such that they deserve greater deference when threatened by 
preemption.‖134 Otherwise, ―[p]reemption can curtail valuable social 
experiments initiated by the people.‖135 Other commentators have 
remarked that plebiscites provide citizens with the opportunity ―to directly 
affect public policy at the ballot box without having to rely on the whims 
of an elected representative,‖ thus enabling the law to be more responsive 
to shifts in prevailing societal norms.
136
  
 
 
subordinate authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of the thing 
indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act of a 
superior [the people] ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and 
subordinate authority [their elected representatives]. 
Hamilton, supra note 95. A strong reading of this principle might, in fact, suggest that the mere fact of 
Prop C‘s enactment should render the federal health care bill constitutionally repugnant, since a subset 
of the people have rejected this act of the ―subordinate‖ legislature. Given that the Federalist Papers 
are not actually part of the text of the Constitution, however, I am reluctant to give this reading much 
weight. I acknowledge that the voters of Missouri might disagree with me. 
 133. Both reasons to prefer popular lawmaking to acts of the legislature were cited by proponents 
of Prop C. Senator Cunningham praised the fact that Prop C allowed Missouri voters to make their 
voices heard without the need for approval from Governor Jay Nixon, a Democrat. Video: January 13, 
2010 - Senator Jane Cunningham Speaks at Patriotic Rally at State Capitol, supra note 23. Senator 
Lembke was eager to bypass not only the executive branch, but the judicial branch as well: 
[W]e have a few liberals in this state that want to settle things the way they always settle 
things: in the courts, instead of allowing the people of Missouri to vote on this issue . . . . I 
can‘t tell you how disappointed I am that people on the other side of this issue would not 
want to allow Missourians to have a vote. 
Video: June 29, 2010 - Senator Jim Lembke Discusses Health Care Freedom Act (Mo. Senate 2010), 
available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/media/10info/Lembke/LembkeSJR25Streaming062910.wmv. 
After Prop C was passed, Senator Cunningham proclaimed, ―The citizens of the Show-Me State don‘t 
want Washington involved in their health care decisions.‖ Messenger, supra note 7. 
 134. DuVivier, supra note 15, at 235. 
 135. Id. at 240. Senator Lembke also invoked the idea of the states as ―laboratories of 
democracy.‖ Audio: Week of 1.11.10 - Senator Jim Lembke Discusses State Sovereignty, supra note 
35. This could also be interpreted as a kind of marketplace theory: the notion that greater freedom to 
experiment with social policy will ultimately produce better policies is an important assumption 
underlying this argument. 
 136. Nate Hendley, Could Ballot Initiatives Work in Canada?, PUNDIT MAG., Nov. 7, 2000, 
quoted in DuVivier, supra note 15, at 238. The obvious objection to this argument is that ―social 
experimentation‖ that reflects prevailing norms may well be rights-trampling for members of various 
minorities. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 13, at 1525–27; see also discussion supra Part IV.B. DuVivier 
arguably corrects for this by including ―matters that expand the rights of individuals without infringing 
on the rights of others‖ among her criteria for plebiscites that should be entitled to the presumption 
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A final, structuralist argument for judicial deference in reviewing 
popular legislation is that the Seventeenth Amendment strengthens the 
constitutional status of the popular vote.
137
 Eule has characterized the 
various government structures set in place by the Constitution as a 
―complex filtering mechanism‖ designed to alleviate ―the threat of 
majority faction.‖138 Thus, according to Eule, the legislative products of 
majority preferences are constitutionally suspect due to the normative 
preference for laws that represent heavily filtered majority preferences 
expressed in the Constitution.
139
 One response to this is that the 
Seventeenth Amendment switch to popular election of U.S. Senators 
represents the removal of at least one ―filter‖ on majority preferences.140 
At the very least, the presence of the Seventeenth Amendment operates to 
weaken the assumption that unfiltered majority preferences create 
unconstitutional outcomes. A stronger reading of the Seventeenth 
Amendment might suggest that the amendment displays a normative 
preference for greater reflection of majority preferences in government.
141
  
To sum up once more, there are a number of compelling arguments for 
affording the products of popular lawmaking greater judicial deference—
via a presumption against preemption in the context of federal preemption 
analysis—than their traditionally enacted counterparts. The ―will of the 
people‖ as sacrosanct within a free, democratic society has instinctive 
normative appeal;
142
 the government should be held accountable to the 
citizens from whom its power derives;
143
 and the law is more responsive to 
popular will when the people play a role in creating it.
144
 Prop C, as a 
straightforward expression of majoritarian disapproval of government, 
appears to amply exhibit all of these desirable features of popular 
lawmaking. The ballot proposition itself was a clear act of seeking to hold 
the federal government accountable to the constitutional standards of its 
constituents, and tedious political processes were unable to thwart or mute 
its message.
145
 Thus, despite the flaws in the process that led to its 
 
 
against preemption. DuVivier, supra note 15, at 248. 
 137. ―The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected 
by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.  
 138. Eule, supra note 13, at 1525–26. 
 139. Id. at 1533; see discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 140. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 141. I am grateful to Professor David Law for an in-class discussion that inspired this argument. 
 142. See discussion supra notes 129–132. 
 143. See discussion supra notes 133–136. 
 144. See discussion supra notes 138–141. 
 145. See discussion supra Part V.B; discussion supra Part II; supra note 133. Note also the 
contrast between Prop C‘s turnaround time, see discussion supra Part II, and the lengthy litigation 
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passage, Prop C appears to have a strong claim to enhanced deference 
upon review by a court. 
VI. WHY DIFFERENTIAL REVIEW OF POPULAR LAWMAKING IS 
UNDESIRABLE 
As noted earlier, Prop C appears likely to be preempted by the federal 
health care law if its constitutional validity is challenged.
146
 The one case 
in which this would not be true, however, is if the federal health care bill 
addressed by Prop C were found to be itself unconstitutional, since there 
would be no conflict with the federal law if the federal law itself does not 
stand. Presumably, and as may be inferred from the earlier discussion of 
the rhetoric surrounding Prop C, a bill that would ―[d]eny the government 
authority‖ to do something147 hinges on the assumption that the exercise of 
government power in question is somehow not authorized—in the case of 
the federal government, not authorized by the Constitution.
148
 One may 
also assume that the Supremacy Clause only grants ―supreme‖ status to 
laws that are valid, i.e. constitutional exercises of federal authority. 
Indeed, the answer to this question of the health care bill‘s 
constitutionality appears to be precisely what Missouri voters who voted 
for Prop C were seeking.
149
 Here, then, is the primary issue with 
differential judicial review of plebiscites: it may stand as an impediment to 
getting the right answer to this highly important question.
150
 
As Professor Robin Charlow has observed, ―[D]ifferent standards of 
review involve more than different deference. They also invoke different 
substantive rules for establishing violations of the equal protection 
guarantee [on which Charlow‘s analysis focuses], which often leads to 
different substantive conclusions.‖151 Since Prop C‘s validity may hinge 
on an analysis of the constitutionality of its federal target, a variation in 
judicial scrutiny, as compared to the same law if it had been passed by the 
Missouri legislature, might very well also mean an undesirable variation in 
the analysis of the health care law‘s constitutionality.152 
 
 
process many other states are pursuing instead, see supra note 51. 
 146. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 147. H.B. 1764, 95th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2010). 
 148. See discussion supra notes 35–40. 
 149. See discussion supra notes 35–40. 
 150. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 151. Charlow, supra note 13, at 594. 
 152. For an example of how varying levels of scrutiny may actually result in the application of 
different substantial norms, see id. at 599–600. In the context of equal protection review, Charlow 
argues that the operative inquiries for standard and heightened judicial scrutiny, which seek a nexus 
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Whether the scrutiny given to Prop C is heightened or relaxed, a 
judicial holding based on such differential scrutiny is inevitably saying 
that when it comes to plebiscites, the Supremacy Clause means something 
different—either that even potentially unconstitutional federal laws trump 
popularly enacted state laws, or that otherwise constitutional federal laws 
may be unconstitutional when they conflict with popularly enacted state 
laws. Because Prop C touches (by design) upon the constitutionality of a 
federal law, to expand or contract the validity of Prop C based on its 
procedural origins is necessarily to expand or contract the constitutionality 
of the federal health care law. To find, for example, that a federal law is 
―supreme‖ against a popularly enacted state law when it might not be 
―supreme‖ against the same law if it were enacted by a state legislature is 
to endow the federal law with a sort of substantive ―superconstitutionality‖ 
stemming from what are really procedural concerns about how the state 
law was enacted. Substantive law is thus made or undone based on 
procedural concerns.
153
  
This conflation of substance with procedure may be observed in both 
of the proposed approaches to differential review discussed in this Note.
154
 
Eule proposes a substantive review to address the motives of voters 
because he has procedural concerns about the initiative and referendum 
processes. DuVivier would give procedural preference to popularly 
enacted laws she sees as having particular substantive value. As with Prop 
C, both of the standards presented here for differential judicial review of 
plebiscites—ostensibly just a higher or lower procedural bar—would 
result in substantive alterations to related law. Eule‘s corrective measures 
to catch discriminatory intent of voters would essentially expand the reach 
of equal protection doctrine with regards to popularly enacted laws.
155
 
 
 
between the legislative act and legislative purpose, are qualitatively different from the truly relevant 
equal protection question—whether or not the affected minority group was given unbiased 
consideration during the lawmaking process. Id. at 599. Charlow ultimately concludes that there is no 
compelling reason to evaluate the products of popular lawmaking differently from their traditionally 
enacted counterparts. Id. at 601. 
 153. Charlow has observed this conflation of procedural concerns with substantive solutions: 
To put it another way, proponents of the special review thesis [an aggregation of a number of 
different arguments in favor of differential judicial review for plebiscites, including Eule‘s, 
discussed infra Part IV.A] maintain that in constitutional challenges to plebiscites, courts 
ought to respond to the third constitutional issue (the substantive constitutionality of laws 
enacted by plebiscite) differently than they would in the case of legislation, even though the 
rationale for doing so, based on something short of unconstitutionality, lies with the first 
constitutional issue (the legitimacy of the plebiscitary process as a form of lawmaking).  
Id. at 560; see also id. at 599–601. 
 154. See discussion supra Parts IV.A and V.A. 
 155. See Charlow, supra note 13, at 599. 
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DuVivier‘s presumption against preemption would contract the force of 
the Supremacy Clause as applied to plebiscites.  
To expand or contract whole areas of substantive federal law to 
account for variables in the state legislative process is an undesirable 
outcome. Ad hoc modifications to constitutional doctrine are not a tenable 
form of jurisprudence. It makes little sense to sacrifice legislative cohesion 
to account for the procedural differences of a form of lawmaking that is at 
most merely a complementary tool alongside the vast cogs of legislative 
machinery.
156
 In the case of Prop C, the electorate of a state has called for 
the evaluation of the constitutionality of a contentious new federal law. 
Why run the risk of answering that question incorrectly simply for the 
sake of correcting constitutionally authorized (by the state constitution) 
lawmaking processes at the state level? Additionally, given all of the 
compelling arguments in favor of both heightened judicial scrutiny and 
judicial deference, adhering to the Court‘s established precedent of 
disregarding the popular origins of the law seems less like simply 
overlooking a law‘s plebiscite status, and more like an appropriate means 
of balancing out these many competing concerns.
157
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Judicial review has been criticized as ―the invocation of power by an 
unelected and largely unaccountable governmental body.‖158 There is a 
sense in which this exercise of power could be seen as complementing the 
sort of raw, majoritarian democracy embodied in popular lawmaking. The 
standard framework for federal preemption analysis, absent any corrective 
considerations for plebiscite origin, might actually accomplish more in the 
context of popularly enacted laws than is immediately obvious—not 
simply because it is a convenient default, but because of the need to 
balance the complex set of priorities and considerations detailed above. 
Courts may thus pursue the correct answer to complex constitutional 
problems rather than struggling to adopt a differential judicial review that 
alters substantive law to account for various procedural strengths and 
 
 
 156. Harel Arnon has observed that this complementary role was all that was envisioned by the 
early champions of popular lawmaking: ―It should be noted . . . [that] most political activists and later 
progressives[] did not view initiatives and referendums as a replacement for the contemporary 
representative system. Instead, they viewed them as a supplement that would be needed in order to 
overcome some of the flaws within the system of representative government.‖ ARNON, supra note 2, at 
11. 
 157. See discussion supra Parts IV.B and V.B.; see also supra Part III.B. 
 158. Eule, supra note 13, at 1531. 
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weaknesses in the lawmaking process. As Prop C demonstrates, popular 
legislation may serve to enforce a kind of constitutional accountability of 
the federal government to the people it is constitutionally obligated to 
serve—and that may be the most vital role that direct democracy can play 
in American government. 
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